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Election Monitoring What Are the
in Oromia Conditions for
Democracy?
Frederick C. Gamst
Professor Gamst, a member of the Joint International Observer group (JIOG),
reports the problems he monitored during the 1992 electoral campaign and voting
activities in the strife-ridden region of Oromia in Ethiopia. His analyses illumi-
nate the background institutional barriers and the politically competitive reasons
for the failure of the elections. Gamst discusses the nature of the multitudinous
Oromo people and the consequences of any election victory by them for the des-
tiny of Ethiopia. He also describes the sometimes violent aftermaths of the failed
election of 1992 and its follow-up election of 1994, in which the Oromo were
again denied reasonable participation in government. He closes questioning of
U.S. policy and its relation to the election failure.
The Emerging Conflicts of Ethnicity
after the Pax Atomica
A political pax atomica, technologically engendered by the nuclear stalemate of
mutually assured destruction between the two superpowers, existed during the Cold
War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the stalemate, a bloody time
of unchecked local conflicts fueled by ideologies of ethnicity has emerged across the
world. In the dawning glow of the new millennium, the world's paramount ethnologi-
cal concerns loom: How inviolate are the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a
polynational country, and what should be the limits of ethnic self-determination, in-
cluding irredentism and secessionism?
These kinds of concerns find ever more incendiary expression, seem inextinguish-
able, and sometimes have a potential for flaring into a wider conflagration in places
such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Angola, Sudan, East Timor, Palestine,
Kurdistan, Chechnya, Chiapas, Kosovo, and virtually unknown Oromia. The dawning
glow of the millennium, then, is tinged with ethnic incandescences.
Today, ethnic wars and lesser combat total about 150 and grow in number. Modern
weaponry and other advanced technology savagely exacerbate these conflicts. Such
fighting kills and maims more civilians than soldiers, drives countless persons as refu-
gees from their homes and livelihood, destroys property in impoverished lands, mili-
tarily expends scarce resources in have-not states, and depresses commerce in coun-
tries with inadequate levels of employment. I turn to the problem of Oromia for a
particularizing illumination of the conflagrant conflicts now flickering and flaring on
the horizon of the new millennium.
Frederick C. Gamst, professor of anthropology, University of Massachusetts Boston, spe-





Background and Nature of the 1992
Elections in Ethiopia
During June 1992, as a member of the Joint International Observer Group (JIOGj, I
helped monitor what was to become the failed, governmentally coerced election process
in former Welega province, southwestern Ethiopia. (Before 1989, Ethiopia comprised
fourteen provinces.) The plan for the elections had the blessing of the United States and
other Western governments and was viewed as the way to bring peace to war-ravaged
Ethiopia. In part, the failure of the countrywide regional elections was fostered by a
lack of normative and institutional support for voting. In a strife-ridden country, this
voting would have resulted in giving long-contested authority to partisan "winners" who
could not readily surrender what they had, at long last, "justifiably" secured. 1
Ethiopia is a polynational state of more than eighty ethnic groups or specific whole
cultures. Many ethnic groups have one or more usually armed political parties. I was
assigned by the JIOG to the western part, former Welega, of the Oromo people's war-
torn region, now called Oromia. This region has roadside debris of destroyed T-54
tanks, armored personnel carriers, and army trucks, all supplied by the former USSR.
The Oromo speak Afaan Oromo, an Eastern Cushitic language, and constitute some 45
percent of the Ethiopian population of perhaps 50 million, and might number 23 million
in Ethiopia. One of the largest ethnic groups in Africa, the Oromo also live in Kenya
and, formerly, in Somalia. A pan-Oromo ethnic identity is a recent, ever growing cul-
tural awakening.
The Oromo problem has bedeviled Ethiopia, a modern empire, since its conquest
creation toward the end of the nineteenth century.2 Beginning in the 1500s, much of the
history of the ancient kingdom of Abyssinia, located in the northern half of today's
Ethiopia and in Eritrea, included epoch struggles between the native authoritarian
Amhara-Tigrayans, speaking Ethio-Semitic languages, and intrusive egalitarian Oromo
groups. 3 Since the 1960s, various Oromo organizations have been in armed insurrection
against the sequential central governments of: the monarchy, with its king of kings
Haile Selassie I; the revolutionary Marxist Derg, which destroyed the monarchy; and
the present government of Ethiopia, resulting from crushing the Derg in 1991 after
years of brutal civil war.
The Contesting Political Actors
Just before and after the 1992 elections in Ethiopia, the three principal bodies of con-
testing actors in western Oromia included, first, the recently militarily victorious
Tigrayans from the far north of Ethiopia, with their national movement, the Ethiopian
People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The Tigrayans organized their
EPRDF to dominate their Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE), which preceded
the present government of the country. Tigrayan control of the transitional government
existed before and after the elections of 1992. Control is through their Marxist, for-
merly guerrilla Tigrayan People's Liberation Front and their Ethiopian People's Revolu-
tionary Democratic Front.4
The second actor is the EPRDF's locally unpopular Oromo client group, the Oromo
People's Democratic Organization, hereafter, called client-Oromo. Similar ethnic client
groups exist for other Ethiopian peoples. The EPRDF wields power independently of its
subordinated organizations: in addition to the irregular troops of its client fronts, the
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EPRDF controls the military and local security forces of Ethiopia. In opposition to the
EPRDF and its client-Oromo is the third actor, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). This
front is broadly popular and is often politically unwise, divisive, and separatist. The
Oromo Liberation Front was the largest non-EPRDF organization in the transitional
government. In 1991, all three fronts, along with others, finally defeated the Derg,
which controlled Ethiopia from 1976 through 1990. 5 "Others" especially include the
militarily powerful Eritrean People's Liberation Front, militarily victorious in its thirty-
plus years of bitter armed struggle in the north against the successive governments of
Ethiopia.
The Eritreans, with their Liberation Front, represent a lesser fourth player in the
region. In 1992, the Eritreans sent peacekeepers to the Oromo region to separate the
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front and the OLF, which had been en-
gaged in destructive battles. Both sides were then supposed to consign their armed
forces to specially designated holding camps. The Soviet-supplied vehicles littering the
Oromia countryside result in part from the struggle for this region between the Oromo
Liberation Front and the EPRDF. The Eritreans, almost until election time, successfully
separated the Tigrayan troops and their Oromo clients from the OLF and maintained the
truce. Enmity between the Oromo Liberation Front and the Ethiopian People's Revolu-
tionary Democratic Front is great, sometimes bloody, and appears to be enduring.
The currently-dominant EPRDF also has considerable opposition from the once
long-dominant ethnic group of Ethiopia, the Amhara, and their independent political
front, and from other ethnic fronts. These matters, however, are outside the scope of this
presentation. Many Amhara are critical of the TGE's partitioning of the country, follow-
ing Leninist thinking, into ten ethnic administrative regions. These so-called self-gov-
erning territories, of which Oromia is one, create more problems of ethnic friction than
they solve. With one or two exceptions of fronts not mentioned in this article, all the
considerable number of fronts in opposition to the Communist Derg were also Marxist.
Today, in conversations with representatives of some of these once unabashedly Marxist
fronts it is denied that the groups either are now or ever were Marxist. But then, at this
time of the "end of history," few political groups want to use the label of passe fashion,
Marxist, anymore.
The Political Contest
In sub-Saharan Africa, a voter usually elects according to his or her particular ethnic
bloc. Thus, if any Ethiopian government dared to risk surrender of its power by holding
a free and fair election — American style, as some Ethiopians label it — the Oromo
would take almost half the vote. The Oromo, allied with some minor groups, would at
long last control the government and the country. But such a control is what the Amhara
and Tigrayans have always fought to prevent. (The Tigrayans suppressed their sibling
Amhara in the civil war that ended in 1991.)
Paradoxically, as a consequence of the 1992 elections, the Tigrayans would be sur-
rendering their authority, gained only through years of costly war involving tens of
thousands of Tigrayan deaths, to one of their battlefield enemies, the Oromo. In 1992,
the Oromo observed an American-brokered truce with the Tigrayans. As I prepared to
travel to Ethiopia for the elections, I could not fathom how the Ethiopian political world
would indeed be turned upside down with the culturally alien democratic elections
advocated by the political missionaries from the West. But then, the Tigrayans
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controlling Ethiopia were allowing foreign observers to monitor their election process.
In every spare moment, my mind dwelt on this Ethiopian paradox of Tigrayan-spon-
sored democratic elections leading to Oromo empowerment. (I later learned that several
million dollars' worth of U.S. aid, desperately needed by the Tigrayans' government,
was contingent upon the holding of the 1992 elections.)
The most important aspect of the countrywide elections of 1 992 was democratic
integration of the Oromo people and their Oromo Liberation Front into the new, post-
Derg Ethiopia. In addition to the 1993 independence of the province of Eritrea, if, as
many of them desire, the Oromo were to secede from Ethiopia, the polynational country
would undoubtedly fragment still further into political chaos and economic nonviability.
Monitoring the Election Strife
My immediate observer group, comprised of seven ardent observers using three Toyota
Land Cruisers, was among the very first to roll out of Addis Ababa for the field assign-
ment. In western Oromia, our assignment was monitoring and reporting on the registra-
tion and campaign processes prior to a democratic election and then on the election
itself. No idea of a loyal opposition existed on either side in the election campaigns,
however. One either supports a political-military front or is its enemy who must suffer
the consequences of this blatant offense. Fear was in the air, and for good reason.
Enough fuel was displayed in our vehicles' roof-mounted Jerry cans to create a blaz-
ing inferno from a potshot in the overweaponed countryside, and we carried cases of
German bottled water and ready-to-eat U.S. Army meals. Our white vehicles were em-
blazoned with the Joint International Observer group's emblem, a dove and a large eye,
in blue and white. "Yeferenjibuda ayn new [Of foreigners' evil eye it is]," one Ethiopian
remarked about this arcane, to him, new symboling. When my vehicle mate and I saw
ten-year-old Oromos with hand grenades attached to their clothing, we would smile
broadly and wave energetically in a friendly fashion. Rocks would have been tolerable,
but fragmentation grenades ... In the eastern part of Oromia, our counterpart observ-
ers, old and good Ethiopia hands all, had to leave the monitoring field prematurely
because of the palpable direct threats to their personnel's safety.
The Joint International Observer group had not tested the short-wave radios of their
three vehicles destined for western Oromia, and we never could use them for the
planned crucial monitoring reports and the vital security linkage to our headquarters in
Addis Ababa. Telephone communication was available, but not always, only from west-
ern Oromia's capital of Nekemti.
"I could have told you that, if someone asked me," commented our driver, an Ethio-
pian army combat veteran, about the limitations of our radios. Several of our skilled and
knowledgeable Ethiopian drivers were miffed at not being consulted during the JIOG's
planning phase or invited to its night-before-departure briefings. These included a
lengthy explanation of elaborate, on-paper, radio protocols and call signs and a question
session. The white bwana still held ethnocentrically insensitive, and thereby inefficient,
sway in Africa.
In the field, we found that the militarily powerful Ethiopian People's Revolutionary
Democratic Front and its Oromo clients engaged in systematic harassment, intimida-
tion, coercion, illegal force, false accusations and imprisonment, and administrative
measures preventing the registration of peasants and townsmen in most areas controlled
by the Oromo Liberation Front. Police-state actions included jailing supporters of the
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Oromo Liberation Front as "bandits" for mere acts of electioneering and partisan public
speech.
One "bandit" was an accredited, overworked physician. My vehicle mate and I felt
we had no authority or mandate to do anything about these political prisoners. Beyond
discussing with their government captors and visibly taking notes on the facts of their
detention, we said only that imprisoning the opposition was not part of a bona fide
election process.
A pair of German election observers, one an escapee from the German Democratic
Republic, went much further, however. They insisted, successfully, that they had the
authority to visit the political prisoners, tape-record interviews with and photograph
them. A few of these "bandits" were consequently released. When I asked the Germans
about their authority for their action regarding the political prisoners, the reply was:
"Me meinen Sie? Was meinen Sie?" Yes indeed, what did I mean? What possibly could
I mean under the circumstances, repressive and dangerous to the political prisoners?
Whatever the appearance of us American observers, the Germans were not candidates
for citizenship in a police state.
The Transitional Government of Ethiopia continued to place all manner of road-
blocks in the path of its formal election process, the main one being not sending the
crucial election registration books and registration cards to the many rural areas firmly
dedicated to its opposition, the Oromo Liberation Front. Thus no voting could occur in
these districts oriented to the OLF. The government thereby ensured that it did not suf-
fer the defeat and the consequences that a democratic election would engender. (Regis-
tration for voting included the designation of a person's ethnic group, a cause for in-
timidation.)
The OLF often retaliated in kind against acts of violence by government-controlled
forces, and it sometimes attacked without immediate provocation. In western Oromia,
all the observers from both sides received written lists, sometimes quite long, reporting
attacks on and imprisonment of people and destruction of property. Deadly violence,
however, was relatively rare until the end of the period for the election process. Some of
the problems with registration must be attributed to unfamiliarity with a culturally
alien, complexly bureaucratic procedure and to numerous local snafus.
Oromos privately voiced their fears to me and to other observers. For example, in
one tension-ridden town, the proprietress of a coffeehouse and brothel, astonishingly,
would not take money from me and my vehicle mate for our coffees. She was so re-
lieved, she said, to have us coming through town periodically in our Toyota. My fellow
observer and I hoped that our temporary and powerless presence did not imply to local
people something we could not ensure, protection for free political and other expres-
sion. Such speech in Oromia is at best foolhardy and can be personally lethal. (Some
Oromo thought we might be in their area for mundane matters, such as providing vac-
cine for their diseased livestock.)
My vehicle mate and I found only a bare handful of Oromo Liberation Front offices
in the approximately two-thirds of western Oromia controlled by the transitional gov-
ernment. When we visited one such office, the two young Oromo Liberation Front ir-
regulars were astonished to see us, for they placed their AK-47 assault rifles, hastily
drawn as we entered, behind a wooden counter. While we sat chatting with them about
the election process, first a policeman and then a surveillance type of the Transitional
Government of Ethiopia came in and stared at us and asked what we were doing in the
OLF post. They then stood within earshot outside the doorway.
106
My co-observer and I patiently worked on many problems and contradictions in
election activities. At one election precinct in a small city, we found that the registration
of voters was greatly retarded, and reduced, because the client-Oromo member of the
mandated three-man registration committee, including a "neutral" and an OLF repre-
sentative, consistently arrived several hours after the office opened early each morning.
Local Oromo and Amhara complained vociferously to us about this reduction of their
right to register. At first it was difficult to catch the young uniformed client-Oromo
soldier, who was bivouacked in a camp about two hours' walk outside of town. He in-
formed me that he could not possibly arrive earlier because of his lengthy morning trek.
In a reply well polished in dealing with my students, I told him to arise, if necessary,
at 4:00 A.M. or earlier to fulfill his obligation as one of the three necessary registrars at
the precinct. My request was entirely unreasonable; he glowered. I recorded his name
and his explanation and reply to me in my notebook and next asked the assembled
crowd of more than fifty persons what day it was, then recording their responsive sym-
bolic factoid. Never before had my ever-present ethnologist's field notepad wielded
such power as during that June. After all, our radio was not functioning and the city
lacked telephone service to Addis Ababa: I did not have a communication link to stand
on. The next day, the errant client-Oromo registrar arrived twenty minutes early. His
commander had ordered him to take lodging at one of the client-Oromo buildings in
town.
Client-Oromo troops were supposed to be stationed in their truce camps, but they
loomed as an intimidating armed uniformed presence in the towns. Our local protests
over this election violation were to no avail, although some troopers then began to ap-
pear without their guns. Nevertheless, those opposed to the transitional government felt
endangered. As a result of the success with the tardy client-Oromo registrar, one gray-
haired elder made a public show of thanking me and grabbing my hand and kissing it
while a throng beamed in approval. I was mildly embarrassed by this display, but far
more apprehensive over his personal safety. A week or so later, he came by to talk to me
in Nekemti as he fled from his province and the client-Oromo. When he left, we em-
braced and kissed each other twice on each cheek, in the manner of two Amhara
friends.
One of the most telling observer experiences was with the three-man Zonal Election
Committee for western Oromia, consisting of a "neutral" chairman, assigned from a
TGE agency in Addis Ababa and partisan client-Oromo and Oromo Liberation Front
members. The committee's mission was to serve as the final level of appeal in western
Oromia regarding disputes over procedure and charges of foul play in the election pro-
cesses, accordingly safeguarding the success of the elections.
At our first meeting with this pivotal committee, the chairman would not answer my
opening general questions, to tell us observers the well-known, publicly announced date
of the election, June 21, or the names of the two partisan members sitting next to him
— also public knowledge and men with whom we had earlier chatted amiably. So
much for my old textbook field practice of beginning with easy, bland questions. The
neutral chairman said he needed instruction from Addis Ababa before he could deal
with the foreigners who came to observe in his province. He was to remain constantly
ill at ease with the Joint International Observer group presence.
Several days later, this neutral chairman appointed by the transitional government
expelled the opposition Oromo Liberation Front member from the zonal committee.
The stated reason was that the opposing leader had been late for meetings on two occa-
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sions. This act solved the problem of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic
Front's opposition raising difficult questions and concerns not being addressed.
Accordingly, I made a telephone call to JIOG headquarters at the comfortable Hilton
Hotel in Addis Ababa regarding this highly destructive action. At first, the JIOG person
said this was just one of the problems that I should expect to encounter in the field and
wanted to dismiss my report without recording it. After some words, I convinced him of
the gravity of this "minor incident" and had him agree to file a formal report to the
transitional government. The OLF man was reinstated in a few days, after someone on
high realized the implications of his expulsion. The highly partisan EPRDF's Transi-
tional Government of Ethiopia was not and could not realistically be considered a neu-
tral party to the elections, any more than we in the United States could have solely the
Democrats or Republicans administer our national electoral process. By my conscien-
tious, unrelenting effort, I had provided the transitional government's election process
with at least one element of legitimacy. I wondered whether I was a provider of fig
leaves to both the Ethiopian and American governments.
The Election Shambles
A week before the election date of June 21,1 had assessed and privately said to my
fellow observers that there would be no elections in the Oromo region. As it turned out,
I was not quite correct in this assessment.
Complaining, four days before the twenty-first, that the election process was rigged
and unfair, the Oromo Liberation Front withdrew from the elections. The OLF later
withdrew from the transitional government. 6 The TGE canceled the elections in the part
of Oromia controlled by the OLF. But the government allowed elections to proceed in
places tightly held by its own forces, as in Nekemti. At such sites, a slate of all-Oromo-
client candidates ran unopposed. On election day, we observers were told by JIOG
headquarters and American embassy personnel to "monitor" (hence, legitimate) this
one-party balloting, an electoral fraud that gave "stuffing the ballot box" a good name. I
did not intend to help make genuine a coercive police-state election.
During the day of briefing after their arrival in Addis Ababa, several American ob-
servers expressed to a facilitator of the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) their view that we might be serving as "window dressing" for a "show elec-
tion" of the military government of Ethiopia. The USAID representative replied pub-
licly that it was not at all the U.S. government's intention for American observers to
serve as window dressing. I took him at his word. Accordingly, on June 19 1 said I
would not so serve on the day of the coercive one-party election in western Oromia. But
this decision became moot.
With reports of increasing unrest and marked armed violence in the south, including
Oromia, reaching the concerned Joint International Observer group headquarters in
Addis Abba, our instructions for our activities in the field constantly changed. We were,
first, ordered to stop our customary travels behind Oromo Liberation Front lines and
work only in the EPRDF-controlled areas. (The Oromo of the Liberation Front, with
whose members I had many intimate conversations, was, logically, extremely friendly
to us.) Then, we were told to remain strictly inside Nekemti town and next we were
allowed to range a limited distance out of this town. Finally, we were instructed that on
June 22, for their personal safety, the remaining Joint International Observer group
observers in western Oromia, as a group, were either to be flown or to drive in convoy
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to Addis Ababa. This full withdrawal would be on the day after I and two other observ-
ers had JIOG orders to complete the group's previously scheduled arrival by us in Addis
Ababa on July 21. Our two-day trip, in a single vehicle on the sole road to this metropo-
lis, was without incident.
Because the JIOG had, from the beginning, booked my fellow observer and me to fly
out of Ethiopia the morning after the elections, July 22, its headquarters in Addis Ababa
had explicitly instructed us to get tickets on the sole flight out of Nekemti town in the
days prior to the election. The two-engine plane was solidly booked with frightened,
mostly Amhara women and children fleeing to the safety of the national capital. We
were told to displace two of these passengers, using our superior social clout as for-
eigner-observers. In other words, we were ordered to depart, so to speak, on "the last
train from Paris," by kicking off two refugees. What would Casablanca''s Rick have
thought of such behavior?
My co-observer and I went through the motions of talking to the Ethiopian Airlines
agent in Nekemti to see just what the consequences of our actions would be. To please
the Joint International Observer group and the transitional government, the agent was
willing to bump two of the hapless women and children escapees for us. The two of us
decided to drive out of Nekemti, instead of flying. It was a far better thing we did, in
this the worst of times. After all, we reflected, the traditional American male norm was
"women and children first." We reported to our JIOG controllers that it was impossible
to guarantee the airplane seats from Nekemti but that they should try to secure them for
us at a central office of the Ethiopian Airlines in their own Hilton Hotel in Addis Ababa.
So we drove.
At first, the JIOG had directed me and two other observers from western Oromia to
return by air to Addis Ababa. This was supposed to be on election day, a day without air
service, after our early morning observations of some voting in Nekemti. After changes
in directives, we were ordered to be in transit by road beginning the day before the
elections. Thus, only by chance, we observed some Leninist one-party "da" balloting in
Ambo town, former Shewa province, for which we had no assignment, introduction, or
familiarity whatsoever. The two other observers accompanying me also acted as wit-
nesses in this informal, uninformed capacity.
The leader of the Eritrean peacekeepers in western Oromia, mediating the truce
between the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front and the Oromo Libera-
tion Front, was an acquaintance of mine from years ago in Paris who came to see me.
Warmly holding my hand, in the customary manner of a friendly Tigrayan, he quietly
informed me that because of combat actions in the region he was withdrawing, for their
security, his peacekeepers from the far west of Oromia. For the same reasons, our fel-
low three intrepid election observers in that area were flown out, leaving behind our
third Toyota.
The OLF forces began to mobilize and move out of their truce-imposed canton-
ments. One such force overran some Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic
Front troops north of Nekemti; another force in the far west attacked a government
election vehicle and its escorting Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
troops. The EPRDF began multiple responses. Like chess pieces, troops and tanks were
being deployed by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia for post-election enforce-
ment of its authority. Prudently flying low, on June 20, a Soviet-built, military helicop-
ter (one of a few still in repair) came to Nekemti and, on June 21,1 observed four empty
flatbed tank carriers moving west toward Nekemti along the road from Addis Ababa.
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(Tanks are not run long distances cross-country for engagements, but instead are trans-
ported to save wear and tear.) The EPRDF might, perhaps, be a novice at free elections,
but enforcement of social control — that was its expert activity.
The Aftermath of the Election
At a post-election evening meeting of JIOG people that I attended in Addis Abba, a
U.S. congressman visiting the capital city for the election day said the following about
the voting and about Meles Zenawi, president of Ethiopia under the transitional govern-
ment: President Meles was a concerned leader; there were (only) some "problems" with
the election; and the leaving of the truce camps by the Oromo Liberation Front had
nothing to do with the election process! "Aren't congressmen insightful?" one American
observer said afterward, and other Ethiopia hands from America agreed with him as
they smiled.
In any event, the EPRDF made a fundamental error in policy when it followed an
outmoded Leninist ideology of using federated ethnicity, that is, a union of Soviets of
specific cultures, as the basis for its reconstruction of the Ethiopian polity. Ethnic iden-
tity is the basis for the new administrative regions of Ethiopia. Reinforcement of nation-
alistic ethnicity and the divisiveness of ethnocentrism and sectarianism were the harvest
to be reaped from the Leninist seeds being sown by the transitional government. The
former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union are factious and unstable examples of
such Leninist policy for a state based on ethnic blocs. A blundering and potentially
bloody miscalculation of this kind by the EPRDF merely feeds movements for the
"Biafraization" of the country, for example, for the Oromo Liberation Front's well-
supported movement for an independent Oromia. It is to be hoped that, in their near-
stalemated political contest, the EPRDF and the Oromo Liberation Front will not even-
tually turn Ethiopia into another former Yugoslavia.
To follow the elections of 1992, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia officially
planned for a multiparty democracy in 1993. After the elections, Tigrayan and Eritrean
forces, continuing their cooperation since 1987, moved through far western Oromia,
first encircling and then reducing the Oromo Liberation Front as a military threat to the
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front.
The transitional government became increasingly coercive and unwilling to allow
pluralistic dissent or exercise of basic freedoms. Holding private property became ever
more an anathema. As was experienced by the election organizers of the Oromo Libera-
tion Front, disagreement by anyone with the Tigrayan Marxists in control of the TGE
became unpatriotic and criminal. Dozens of criticizing Ethiopian journalists have been
imprisoned.
Matters came to a head in January 1 993 at the campus of Addis Ababa University,
where faculty members and students openly criticized the transitional government, its
policies, and its suppression of ideas. EPRDF troops fired at assembled students, killing
at least one and wounding others. The Transitional Government of Ethiopia then dis-
missed without due process forty of the faculty members and administrators and di-
rectly took control of the university.
On September 7, 1993, EPRDF troops shot and killed and wounded dozens of civil-
ians in a church in Gonder town. The praying congregation had refused to scatter at the
command of the soldiers who were attempting to arrest a priest. In December 1993, a
Conference on Peace and Reconciliation met mainly at the request of political groups
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not in the transitional government. But the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary
Democratic Force would not participate and arrested several of the conference del-
egates. In January 1994, the TGE expelled two nonclient ethnic fronts from the govern-
ment because of their participation in this conference. The true base of support for the
TGE had narrowed largely to the Tigrayans and their Tigrayan People's Liberation
Front, their client fronts, plus a few quite small organizations. Former president Jimmy
Carter tried to mediate this dangerous situation, in vain. 7
The follow-up elections to those of 1992 were finally held on June 5, 1994. Not
surprisingly, creating Soviet-scale results, the EPRDF won 89 percent of seats for the
new national assembly. On September 20, 1994, according to Amnesty International,
hundreds of peaceful persons demonstrating against the summary arrest of a former
university professor and dean were imprisoned and beaten.
On April 19, 1995, Amnesty International charged that during its four-year rule, the
government of Ethiopia detained thousands without charges, made dozens vanish, and
tortured others. In September 1995, the first U.S. Peace Corps volunteers since 1977
entered Ethiopia.Some were posted to the high school in Nekemti. On October 7, 1996,
the Committee to Protect Journalists, in New York, released its report, "Clampdown in
Addis," criticizing the government's repression of journalists. In December 1996, So-
malia and Ethiopian forces clashed near Dolo.
During 1997, Amnesty International requested that the Ethiopian government release
the Oromo leaders it arrested and imprisoned, without having been charged with any
offense, during its crackdowns against the organizations of these people. Many of these
leaders had merely been protesting violations of human rights by the government. The
government accused the Oromo Liberation Front of the 1 997 bombings in Harer and
Addis Ababa, something denied by the OLF And in 1998, the Tigreans of Eritrea and
the Tigreans of Ethiopia went to war, replete with attacks of jet fighter bombers, over
some contested border strips of semidesert.
Today, Oromo client administrators, now governing Oromia, have not put a stop to
the ethnic cleansing in their region of Amhara and other non-Oromo persons by Oromo
militants. In the Somalia region, formerly the Ogaden area of Ethiopia, Oromia, and
other regions, strife flares between local people and Ethiopian People's Revolutionary
Democratic Front soldiers.
With the Oromo Liberation Front outside the government, no effective balance to
Tigrayan power exists. In the vacuum of the disengagement of the OLF, the client-
Oromo assumed power under the aegis of the EPRDF. Through decentralization of
power to ethnic regions having puppet governance, the Tigrayans maintain control of
Ethiopia. Support from the West, including the United States in its Panglossian illusion,
continues for the Tigrayan government. In return for a stable government — thus, no
unpalatable TV newscasts — the United States settles for the rhetoric rather than the
substance of democracy in Ethiopia. Rewarding this government by supplying the sec-
ond-largest amount of aid it gives to an African country, the United States does little to
have the EPRDF seek an accommodation with the majority of Oromo, Amhara, Somali,
and others not recognizing its ethnic client organizations.
Perhaps the Ethiopian elections of 1992 did not fail in their intent. Perhaps there was
no paradox in their conception in Addis Ababa — or in Washington. As regarding the
former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sudan, and the Congo, the Bush and Clinton administra-
tions desired to see no, hear no, and speak no evils of massive fatalities and suffering
from ethnic strife in the Horn of Africa. To admit to the existence of such atrocities
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requires moral policymaking and leadership resulting in corrective action, unpopular for
a U.S. president seeking affirmation from the public opinion polls — and the voting
polls. $»
This speech, originally delivered at the Distinguished Lecture Series, University of
Massachusetts Boston, December 12, 1994, has been updated by the author.
Notes
1. What follows applies to the former Welega province, now the western part of Oromia,
as based upon my firsthand in-field experiences, discussions with subjects of re-
search, and events reported to me by nine fellow observers in the province. My com-
ments as an ethnologist, with more than three decades of experience in Ethiopia and
Ethiopian affairs, do not necessarily reflect the views of any other person or organiza-
tion.
2. Emperor Menelik the Great, an Amhara, added by armed force what became his
southern, frequently Oromo, provinces to the largely Amharan and Tigrayan core
provinces of Christian Abyssinia in the north. Menelik's conquests realized an Abys-
sinian control of southern Ethiopia.
3. Today, as in the past, the Oromo refer to their Amhara-Tigrayan conquerors generally
as Habesha (Abyssinians) and individually and locally as neftenya (rifle bearers). The
Abyssinians were the newly superimposed regional armed elite, and even in the
1960s carried a rifle as a symbol of power on ceremonial occasions. In the past
Amhara-Tigrayans labeled the Oromo as the "scourge of God" and today refer to
Oromo by the prejudicial term Galla, which has a range of denotations and connota-
tions, but it could best be explained as the Abyssinians' label for the menacing
hordes of a non-Christian, African "other." For Habesha, Galla are the kind of people
to be politically subordinated and culturally marginalized, including persecuted and
discriminated against in a wide range of overt and covert ways. During the past cen-
tury or so, being Oromo means being mentally and socially marred by Abyssinians'
views of history. The interpretation of such marring is nurtured, in part, by an Oromo
intelligentsia residing in the Horn and scattered globally in the Oromo diaspora. The
Oromo are usually characterized by Western scholars as egalitarian, by which some
manner of being democratic is meant. That is, in their traditional generational system
of social organization consisting of age sets and age grades (gada), some Oromo
groups still have and most formerly had married men discussing and initiating political
and religious policies and actions, including juridical.
4. Meles Zenawi, a Marxist Tigrayan, is the president of Ethiopia. He heads the post-
Derg government of Ethiopia and is the leader of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF), including its ethnic client organizations. Besides their
homeland in the former Tigray province on the southern border of Eritrea, the
Tigrayans are the largest and dominant ethnic group of Eritrea. Tigrayan-dominated
Eritrea was allowed its independence in 1993, against Amhara protests, by the
Tigrayan-controlled transitional government. To the anger of the Amhara, Eritreans
held many government and private commercial jobs in Addis Ababa, the capital of a
country now no longer that of the Eritreans yet one with great unemployment for the
educated.
5. The Derg's control was effected in large part by means of several billion dollars'
worth of Soviet military aid and advice used to kill and maim hundreds of thousands
of Ethiopians. Many were murdered by the state and buried in secret mass graves.
Owing to the Derg's doctrinaire central planning and control of resources and its re-
lentless warfare, many hundred thousands of other Ethiopians starved to death or be-
came displaced refugees.
6. Separately, in its region to the north, the independent party of the once-dominant
and numerous Amhara, the All-Amhara People's Organization, also withdrew from
the election. Other non-EPRDF fronts withdrew from the elections in their respective
areas. Elections were held in most areas, however.
7. On March 23, 1994, the Carter Center reported: "After extensive discussions with
leaders of opposition groups and with the government, we have been unable to find a
mutually acceptable basis for direct talks between the government and opposition
groups."
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